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Abstract 
The assumption permeating this thesis is that, in the consensus democracy, the government should 
respond to the minority interests, which are operationalized as bills sponsored by the opposition. The 
research pays attention to the typical case of autocratizing states with gradual democratic backsliding – 
Ukraine. Arguably, in the context of the steady deterioration on the democratic end, there is a risk of 
political exclusion and, even more, the democratic breakdown. So, I analyze 2868 bills across three 
convocations of the Ukrainian parliament, covering the period of 2007-2019. The aim is to see whether 
ignoring opposition’s proposals occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. 
The quantitative analysis shows that, first, bills sponsored by the opposition are less likely to be adopted 
than those sponsored by the government. Second, the more cosponsors the bill has, the larger are its 
chances for adoption. The findings are predominantly in line with the previous research on the 
legislative success determinants. However, one should be cautious with interpreting the increase of the 
cosponsors’ effect since it is different for different cosponsorship groups. The other tested determinants 
of legislative success, i.e., the proximity of elections and the gender, do not find sufficient support. The 
case selection with the explicit opposition-government split indicates the necessity of conducting a 
similar study in the institutional context of temporary issue-based coalitions. Then, it will be possible 
to argue whether the regime’s dynamics influence the opposition’s legislative success. 
Keywords: legislative success, opposition, consensus democracy, autocratization. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Dahl (1971, 1-2), democracy involves “continuing responsiveness of the government to 
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” Following this logic, a state on its way to 
democratization is developing a system and culture, where the government considers all citizens’ 
opinions, including opposition supporters. Regarding the organization of democracies, Lijphart (2012, 
2) differentiates between majoritarian and consensus models, with the majoritarian model being 
exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, and the consensus model being inclusive and characterized by 
bargaining and compromise.  
Lijphart also notes that the consensus model works better for heterogeneous and even for fairly 
homogeneous countries. The idea underlying is that in the plural societies – those societies, sharply 
divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate 
sub-societies, – the majority rule can turn into majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than 
democracy (Lijphart, 2012, 31-32). The condition behind the success of majoritarian mode is relatively 
homogeneous societies and that the major parties have usually not been very far apart in their policy 
outlooks, which tend to stay close to the political center (Lijphart, 2012, 31).  
The inclusion in the policy-making process of as many parties as possible, the majority as a minimum, 
is the condition for the consensus democracies’ success (Lijphart, 2012, 32). The idea behind that is to 
prevent the dictatorship by the plurality and even the majority. A broad inclusion is also essential for 
the policies’ stability in the long run when the government and the opposition change their roles, and 
the turnaround on the pursued policies may occur. Hence, to meet the population’s demands as much 
as possible, the government, including its parliamentary party or parties1, should make policies 
corresponding to the interests of both their supporters and opposition. 
Surprisingly, the popular democracy indices do not consider parliamentary opposition’s abilities to 
implement their policies or incorporate minority interests into the governmental agenda. The indices 
focus on the measurements of the opposition’s abilities to participate in the electoral competition and 
their government oversight function abilities. The latter is sometimes not about the opposition per se, 
but about the system of checks and balances between different branches of power2 (Marshall, Gurr & 
Jaggers, 2019; “Freedom in the World Research Methodology,” 2020; Democracy Index 2019, 2020; 
Coppedge et al., 2020).  
To know what the opposition can do, one must analyze their institutional opportunity structure, which 
can take place in- as well as out-of-parliament and which concentrates around parliamentary opposition 
two main goals: controlling the government and presenting alternatives (Garritzmann, 2017,2,8). 
Among the out-of-parliament institutional opportunities of the opposition, one can name the existence 
of a constitutional court that has the right to annul government bills or laws, or of referendums, when 
people can show the opposite to the majority stance. These opportunities are about controlling the 
government and are not exclusive to the parliamentary opposition. Other actors can also make use of 
them. 
 
1 Further, I use only the singular form – “party” – to be more concise. Nevertheless, the usage of “party” or 
“parties” depends on the political system or the outcome of the elections. 
2 The Polity IV Project measures, among others, the competitiveness of participation, the regulation of 
participation, and the executive constraint, which is about “the checks and balances between the various parts of 
the decision-making process.” The Freedom House measures opposition’s opportunity to increase support or gain 
power through elections, as well as evaluates the safeguards against official corruption and abuse of power. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit measures the realistic prospect of opposition parties to achieve government, as well 
as effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority. The V-Dem data includes the 
variable on “legislature opposition parties,” measuring the opposition’s oversight and investigatory functions. The 
“opposition parties autonomy” variable is about opposition parties being independent and autonomous of the 
ruling regime. V-Dem has also various variables on checks and balances of branches of power, e.g., 
“Presidentialism Index,” “HOS veto power in practice.” 
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The elements of the in-parliament opportunity structure are those truly inherent to the various types of 
opposition in the parliament (considered further). The controlling in-parliament opportunities include 
addressing oral and written questions to members of the government; setting in motion a vote of no 
confidence; the right to establish investigation committees; the requirement of qualified majorities 
while passing constitutional amendments, as well as being able to hold high or even chair positions in 
committees. All the mentioned opportunities are essential for the executive-legislative balance of 
power, one the consensus democracy indicators. 
However, as discussed above, this study looks at political inclusion and broad power-sharing since 
compromise and cooperation are key during democratization periods as many divergent interests have 
to be reconciled. With this respect, the area to concentrate is the opposition’s in-parliament presenting 
alternatives opportunities. These opportunities include the ability to initiate private member bills or 
amendments and participation in agenda-setting (Helms, 2008, 11; Garritzmann, 2017, 9). In particular, 
my interest lies with the translation of the opposition’s suggestions into policies, since it is the practical 
implementation of the consensus democracy concept.  
The consolidation of democracy is a complex process, which can either proceed or step back. The latter 
option with a steady deterioration on the democratic end is the other area to focus since, in the context 
of autocratization, political exclusion may push closer to democratic breakdown.  
Previous research suggests that the drivers behind the current processes of autocratization mostly 
function within a legal framework and occur gradually, which makes them difficult to pinpoint 
(Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019, 1098, 1104). In this research, I aim to probe whether ignoring 
opposition’s alternatives or ideas occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. 
It can demonstrate whether the parliament can be a forum for bargaining and compromise. The 
opposition’s alternatives or ideas are operationalized as the sponsored bills.  
To this end, I study Ukraine as a typical case of autocratizing states. Moreover, regarding this case, 
there is a practical necessity to consider governmental attitudes to the opposition. Currently, Ukraine 
does not have any specific regulations on the activities of the parliamentary opposition. However, on 
and off discussions have been initiated by the civil society and parliamentarians (Cheretun, 2020). The 
current speaker of the parliament Dmytro Razumkov has stressed the necessity to develop the law on 
the opposition, underlining that, in the past, good initiatives, coming from the opposition, have been 
dismissed not because they were poor, but because they were not governmental (Shcherbyna and Lelich, 
2019).  
The structure of the thesis is the following. The second and third chapters present the theoretical 
framework. I highlight the approaches to defining the opposition and the variables contributing to bills 
adoption. The built framework allows identifying the research gap and specifying hypotheses in the 
fourth chapter. In the next chapter, I elaborate on the case-relevant information, i.e., I dwell on the case 
selection, review Ukraine’s regime type and its alteration, legislative procedure and summarize with 
the dominant opposition mode. Chapters six, seven, and eight are about data management, 
operationalization, and method, as well as data description. Chapter nine is dedicated to analysis and 
results. There, I analyze 2868 bills across three convocations. The quantitative analysis shows that the 
bills sponsored by the opposition are significantly less likely to be adopted. Moreover, with the increase 
of cosponsors in the opposition bills, their adoption is also less likely. The last chapter presents the 
concluding discussion, which also covers the generalizability and limitations. 
2. Defining Opposition 
Before discussing the translation of the opposition’s suggestions into policies, one needs to understand 
what type of opposition is referred to since the literature has several approaches to defining opposition. 
In the section below, I review them and decide on the one I am going to use further. Within a chosen 
definition, I consider indicators of opposition type. In a subsequent section, I review institutional 
determinants contributing to opposition type. So, based on opposition type indicators and institutional 
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determinants, one may define the kind of opposition expected to exist in each state context. It allows us 
to build the theoretical framework further in the research. 
Opposition Types 
Norton (2008, 237) outlines at least four types of opposition. The first one is ‘the Opposition,’ which is 
the principal, usually the largest, nongovernmental party. The second one is the ‘opposition parties.’ 
They comprise all those parties in the legislature that do not form the government. Although the term 
may sometimes include parties outside the parliament, for this research, any ‘extra-parliamentary 
opposition,’ the other type outlined by Norton, is out of the scope. The term ‘opposition parties’ does 
not account for instances when a party in the coalition government adopts an oppositional position. 
Such relations are encompassed by the more general term ‘opposition’, which considers the conflict 
between the actors.  
Norton’s approach to defining opposition seems to be either too case-specific or too extensive. 
Identifying the source of the parliamentary opposition in institutional terms is more justifiable if one 
aims to make the definitions applicable in various contexts. To this end, Kopecký and Spirova (2008) 
use an approach based on the modes of the executive-legislative relations redefined by Andeweg and 
Nijzink (1995). The modes of relations describe the interactions of the actors, which, as the game theory 
posits, can be cooperative or defective. Opposition in such a framework is always about defection.  
Initially, King (1976) described the relations within the executive-legislative system3. He distinguishes 
five possibly coexisting modes of the executive-legislative interaction – the opposition, intra-party, 
interparty, non-party, and cross-party modes. These modes may coexist, depending on institutional 
characteristics (1976, XX). Andeweg and Nijzink (1995) modified King’s typology, arguing that three 
modes should suffice to analyze the executive-legislative relations. These three modes are non-party, 
cross-party, and inter-party modes, with the latter having two submodes – intra-
coalition and opposition submodes. 
In this research, I use Andeweg and Nijzink’s typology and, if necessary, refer to the original typology 
by King. So, following Kopecký and Spiriva’s, I point that it is needed to identify and locate the source 
of the parliamentary opposition in institutional terms (2008, 136). Below, I describe the modes and their 
indicators.  
Inter-party mode. Andeweg and Nijzink’s inter-party mode is about interactions among parties. It 
unites King’s inter-party mode and opposition modes. The argument for such transformation is that 
King’s “inter-party mode contains the elements of opposition mode” (Andeweg and Nijzink’s, 155). 
Nevertheless, Andeweg and Nijzink keep the distinction between the interactions among a 
governmental and nongovernmental party or group of parties and the interactions within a coalition of 
parties4. For that purpose, they distinguish the opposition and the inter-coalition submodes, 
respectively. 
Among the indicators of the inter-party mode, Kopecký and Spirova (2008, 142-144) name the 
recruitment pattern of cabinet ministers, the (non-)existence of coalition agreements, the level of party 
discipline, and stability in the legislature. They argue that the inter-party mode is more dominant under 
several conditions. 
The first condition is when the Cabinet recruits ministers from the parliament. Then, there is a closer 
fusion between the two branches of government. However, this point is only relevant for the systems 
when the MP can take a seat in the Cabinet. The second condition is the existence of a coalition 
agreement. It defines the cooperation between government parties and lays out policies that are not 
legally but politically binding for adoption. The last condition is high party discipline or cohesion. 
 
3 He considers the cases, where the Cabinet members are at the same time the MPs. Nevertheless, one can also 
utilize King’s framework of modes in those political systems, where the Cabinet members do not belong to the 
parliament. Depending on countries’ institutional contexts, which have unique dynamics and structure of power, 
the modes occurring and prevailing in the systems vary (King, 1972, 32). 
4 Inter-coalition submode is possible only in the multiparty governments. 
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Despite Kopecký and Spirova (2008) use the term party cohesion, I argue that it would be more 
appropriate to use coalition cohesion instead since party cohesion relates to the intra-party interactions.  
Speaking about opposition submodes, one may split up the possible types of interplay within them: (1) 
governmental party supports the nongovernmental party, (2) governmental party 
opposes5 nongovernmental party, (3) nongovernmental party supports the governmental party, (4) 
nongovernmental party opposes governmental party. So, items one and two demonstrate the attitude of 
the governmental party towards the nongovernmental party. Whereas items three and four show how 
far the governmental party’s policies are from the interests of the nongovernmental party. Item one also 
indicates the inclusion of the nongovernmental parties’ interests to the government agenda and policies. 
Regarding the inter-coalition submode, the possible number of interplays depends on the number of 
governmental parties. One may perceive it as coalition cohesion. 
The definition of the interparty opposition following from the described interactions is that it is non-
cooperation among the parties. In practical terms, it takes place when one party does not support the 
position, proposal, or bill of the other. 
Non-Party and Cross-Party Modes. The substance of cross-party and non-party modes coincide in 
both King’s as well as Andeweg and Nijzink’s typologies. For the cross-party mode, the critical source 
of parliamentary interactions are MPs united by the shared interests, which may be sectoral, regional, 
ethnic, or professional, and, in some cases, they may be of clientelist character (Kopecký and Spirova, 
139, 2008; Rakner and van der Walle, 2009, 114). In this mode, partisanship cannot be a base of 
interaction. Hence, the cross-party opposition relates to non-cooperation regarding the issues, which 
are not characterized by party divisions.  
The cross-party mode’s indicator is the influential committees that stand against the Cabinet, as well as 
the parliamentary majority, and put on the agenda sectoral or specialized rather than party interests 
(Kopecký and Spirova, 2008, 145). 
Non-party mode, labeled by King (1976, 20) as “the least important,” covers the interaction of ministers 
and parliamentarians with each other as members of two different institutions (Kopecký and Spirova, 
139, 2008). Like in the cross-party mode, the partisan dimension does not matter here, since it may 
preclude the efficiency. The indicators of the non-party mode are the frequency of the government bills 
being rejected, the proportion of bills initiated by parliamentary backbenchers, and the role of 
investigative commissions (Kopecký and Spirova, 2008, 146-147). So, the non-party opposition is 
about the confrontation of the MPs and the government. 
The non-party opposition indicators are the high frequency of the rejected governmental bills, the high 
legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, and the influential role of investigative commissions. 
In terms of the high legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, I argue that this indicator is not 
relevant for the systems, where the executive and legislative branches are separated. In such systems, 
there is no such notion as “backbencher.”  
Despite that, the concept of opposition involves disagreement among the parties of the interaction, 
Norton (2008, 240) argues that being in ‘opposition’ does not necessarily entail a negative stance 
regarding motions advanced by the government; it merely stipulates that one is not in government. It is 
especially noticeable in the non-party and cross-party modes. The former can encompass a negative or 
constructive approach, while the latter – a constructive, or, at least, consensual approach (Norton, 2008, 
240). 
Intra-Party mode. Andeweg and Nijzink (1995, 156) state that the intra-party mode, which describes 
interactions within a party, is “redundant in the analysis of the relations between MPs and ministers.” 
They argue that the intra-party mode may exist only for the majority government, and it does not 
describe the relations within the whole parliamentary-governmental complex but only within the 
government party. Furthermore, the authors argue that the intra-party mode is void of content, unlike 
 
5 Here and further, “oppose” is a synonym to “not support,” and vice versa. 
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the other modes, which are about the common good, or constitutional fastidiousness (non-party mode); 
political ideology (inter-party mode); and social interests (cross-party mode). 
Although this critique may hold for executive-legislative relations in the systems, where MP may hold 
ministerial positions, it is irrelevant for the systems, where the executives and MPs are differentiated. I 
argue that the intra-party mode is about party cohesion. So, regarding Andeweg and Nijzink’s critique, 
I suggest moving away from the original King’s example of the interaction within the governing party 
and use the term for describing the interaction within any party. 
I insist on the necessity to keep the intra-party mode in the classification and argue that its content is 
the power struggle and accountability before the electorate. It opposes the claim of Andeweg and 
Nijzink (1995, 156) of the intra-party mode being void of content. Further, in the research, I adopt 
Andeweg and Nijzink’s framework of the executive-legislative relations apart from their stance on the 
intra-party mode, which I decide to keep. 
Hence, the intra-party opposition is the contrary notion to the high levels of party cohesion. On the one 
hand, unified collective action is necessary for a party to pursue its mutual goals. On the other hand, 
the discipline required for effective collective action can undermine individual legislators’ 
responsiveness to their constituents (Carey, 2003, 192-193). So, parties may have organized or 
temporary groupings operating within their ranks, and these groupings may not always approve of the 
party leadership’s line (Norton, 2008, 239). Intra-party opposition leads to a low party cohesion, which, 
in its turn, precludes predictability of supporting the legislature. The other option to express the dissent 
is to exit the party. Indicators of this type of opposition are the MPs’ defection from the party line in 
the roll call voting and committee activities, public criticism of own party, party-switching.  
Norton (2008, 239) argues that defections from parties (intra-party mode) and defections by parties 
(intra-coalition submode) is mainly a feature of the parliamentary politics in the developing 
democracies. The cases of Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in his research are examples. 
Desposato (2009, 109), in the study for Brazil, supports that opinion, stating that party-switching is 
most common in the transitioning democracies with evolving party systems. However, with the 
development of parliamentarism, the defection rates tend to decrease (Norton, 2008, 239). Defections, 
taking place in long-established legislatures, e.g., the UK Parliament and the US Congress, are likely 
due to the lack of discipline (Nokken, 2009, 81). Nokken and Pool (2004) indicate that, over 163 years, 
only 38 US Senators and 160 US House members switched parties, which is rare in comparison 
(Nokken, 2009, 81). 
As Andeweg and Nijzink (1995, 176) note, the prevalence of a specific mode at the time depends on 
the issue under discussion and the MP’s approach herself. I argue that the same is true for the opposition 
types. Depending on the executive-legislative interaction mode, which, in its turn, depends on the 
country’s institutional framework, the opposition may have several sources: the government or coalition 
government, governmental party or coalition parties, nongovernmental parties, and MPs. 
Institutional Determinants of Opposition Type 
In the discussion of the institutional determinants of opposition type, scholars identify regime type, the 
form of government and electoral institutions, which encompass electoral system, district magnitude, 
and candidate-selection rules (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Hix, 2004; Jones and Hwang, 2005; Hix and 
Noury, 2016; Bräuninger et al., 2016; ). So, below, I summarize their findings. 
Regime type (parliamentary or presidential) and form of government (a single-party majority, 
multiparty majority, and minority) are, according to Hix and Noury (2016, 250), vital institutional 
variables defining voting in legislatures. Their findings demonstrate that in parliamentary systems with 
single-party or coalition majority and presidential systems with a single-party majority, there is 
government-opposition split in parliaments. One may infer that this split corresponds to the opposition 
submode of legislative-executive interactions. As for parliamentary systems with coalition minority and 
presidential systems with coalition majority or minority, the split changes from issue to issue and has 
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no relation to government-opposition duality. So, one may refer this split to the cross-party mode of 
legislative-executive interactions. 
Bräuninger et al. (2016), in their model applicable to parliamentary systems, demonstrate strong 
incentives for MPs to vote strategically based on the governmental or oppositional origin of a proposal. 
There is also evidence that the opposition does not support government proposals and vice versa 
(Bräuninger et al., 2016, 190). 
Electoral institutions are the other determinants of possible opposition types. Hix (2004, 196) looks at 
the electoral system, district magnitude, and candidate-selection rules. Not to dwell on the details, these 
variables broadly define the extent to which the MPs depend on the party decisions and whether they 
can or cannot develop personal reputation distinct from the party (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 418). 
Regarding the electoral system, Hix (2004, 196-198) puts them on the spectrum from the closed-list 
proportional representation (PR) systems, which represent the most party-centered settings, to fully 
open-list PR systems and single-transferable-vote systems, which represent the most candidate-centered 
setting. Single-member-simple-plurality (SMSP) and single-member-alternative vote or double-ballot 
systems, which promote a mixture of partisan and candidate affinity, are in the middle of that spectrum 
(intermediate systems). So, on the spectrum from closed to fully open-list PR, the modes shift from the 
inter-party to cross-party. 
So, starting from the intermediate systems and up to the candidate-centered settings, the district’s role 
increases, prompting the MPs to unite on a regional cross-party basis. Jones and Hwang (2005) theorize 
about provincial or regional factors in roll-call voting using the Argentinian case but fail to find any 
empirical support. However, they do not deny the local influence on the legislative process but 
emphasize that it may be exerted through other channels, which, in their case, is the central 
governmental party. There, the regional factor amplified the government-opposition duality. 
Regarding district magnitude, Hix (2004, 198) theorizes that in small districts, candidates are more 
vulnerable to party pressure. One may infer that MP is more likely to stick to the party policies if the 
MP from a small district has ambitions for the next term. In such a case, the inter-party mode of 
legislative-executive relations should prevail. 
Regarding candidate-selection rule, Hix’s argument (2004, 199) is that the more centralized the 
candidate selection process is, the higher the ability of the party leadership to influence its legislators. 
Here, the dominant mode of interactions is supposed to be the inter-party mode. However, this argument 
fails to consider MP’s intentions to cooperate with that party during the next elections. If that remark is 
true, the perspective of the cross-party mode is more likely. 
3. Legislative Success Determinants 
The previous chapter primes that the government-opposition divide may be the determinants of 
legislative success or failure. However, there are several other possible determinants. Below, I draw 
from Ellickson and Whistler’s (2000, 86) conceptual model of bill-passage success, as well as from 
Aleman and Calvo’s (2008, 14) sets of variables explaining legislative success. The variables 
predominantly overlap within the outlined groups. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions, authors assign 
the same variables to different groups, e.g., seniority belongs to individual factors in Aleman and Calvo 
(2008, 17) and institutional factors in Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 80). If such a contradiction 
happens, I chose one of the presented options based on personal perception of the determinant. So, in 
Institutional and Contextual Factors, I discuss majority-minority, responsible committee (issue), the 
urgency of bill, the proximity of elections, diversity of cosponsorship, and regional interests. Then, in 
Individual Characteristics, I consider gender, seniority, race, education, leadership, ideology, and 
informal connections.  
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Note, this research assumes that MPs initiate bills with the prospects to pass them. Although one should 
not rule out legislative spam6 as a purpose, I ignore such ill practice. Among the MPs’ motivations to 
pass bills, one should single out making public policy, pleasing the electorate, and consequently getting 
reelected (Anderson et al., 2003, 359-360). By any means, bills passage is one of the primary goals of 
legislators.  
Institutional and Contextual Factors 
Majority-minority. The literature on the US Congress posits that membership in the majority party is 
one of the dominant explanations of legislative effectiveness (Moore and Thomas, 1991, 965; Anderson 
et al., 2003, 359; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 14). The expectation is that the bills introduced by members 
of the majority party would have a higher probability of passage than those sponsored by other parties. 
The support to that has also been found outside the US context. In the Argentinian case, Aleman and 
Calvo (2008, 25) have found that members of the largest party in the chamber have a significant 
advantage over others. Although Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 988) do not explicitly investigate 
majority-minority, their results from the Mexican case indicate that belonging to the presidential party 
is a significant determinant for legislative success.  
Responsible committee (issue). Some issues and, subsequently, committees responsible for them may 
be considered more important than others. So, while setting the agenda, more salient issues are 
prioritized, which increases the chance for the salient bills to pass.  
The urgency of the bill. Given the particular political context, some bills address urgent issues that 
cannot be postponed or cannot go through the usual legislative flow. So, such hot bills are theorized to 
be more successful (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 15; Anderson et al., 2003, 365).  Anderson et al. (2003, 
371) do not find support for such bills. 
The proximity of elections. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 16) theorize that legislators should be less 
effective in passing their bills during an election year because then the parties are focused on the 
electoral contest, and many legislators are campaigning for reelection or seeking alternative ways to 
further their political career. On the other hand, MPs may seek more bill passage closer to elections to 
demonstrate their efficiency to the electorate or pass bills popular for reelection. 
Diversity of cosponsors. More than one initiator of the bill can signal the broader support of the 
proposal. Moreover, individual characteristics of cosponsored bills initiators may enhance legislative 
success. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 15) distinguish between within-party and cross-party cosponsorship, 
suggesting that their effect may vary. Proposals endorsed by members of different parties can imply 
consensus of the sides, which may help the bill to pass. 
On the other hand, cross-party sponsorship may indicate weakness – a lack of attractiveness among co-
partisans. Cosponsorship, in general, increases the chances of the bill to be approved (Bratton and 
Haynie, 1999, 671; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 15). The positive relation between cross-party 
cosponsorship and legislative success finds support in the Argentinian context (Aleman and Calvo, 
2008, 27). For the US, the evidence of cosponsorship is mixed (Campbell, 1982; Wilson and Young, 
1997; Adler and Wilkerson, 2005). 
Regional interests. In systems with single-member districts, MPs may group around local interests 
(Anderson et al., 2003, 369; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 18; Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013, 895). Moreover, 
if MPs plan to run from that district again and in the previous elections, they have had a slim electoral 
margin, they are unlikely to legislate beyond the district’s preferences. So, MPs focusing on regional 
rather than national interests may face more failures because of the national level’s lack of local interests 
support. In line with this argument, Anderson et al. (2003, 366) find significant negative relations 
between regional specification and legislative success. 
 
6 Legislative spam involves submitting many bills aiming to distract or overload the parliament’s capacity. 
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Individual Characteristics 
Gender. The evidence that any gender has more advantage in legislative success is mixed. Aleman and 
Calvo (2008, 27), in Argentinian case, find that women’s bills being approved less often than bills from 
their male counterparts. For the Mexican case, Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 989) state that bills, 
sponsored by only males or only females, pass at similar rates and that there is a lack of evidence of 
female marginalization in Mexican parliament. In the US context, women are generally as likely as men 
to achieve passage of the legislation they introduce (Bratton and Haynie, 1999, 658). Ellickson and 
Whistler (2000, 77) conclude that different factors affect female and male legislative success. Men 
achieve legislative positions and bill-passage success by more extensive involvement in the majority 
party and traditional legislative politics, while women benefit more from personal attributes and 
legislative politics. 
Seniority. Experienced legislators, who have already served a tenure or more, have higher chances of 
getting their bills passed due to a better understanding of the legislative process. Junior legislators or 
freshmen do not have skills to navigate proposals through institutional and partisan obstacles, as well 
as create attractive bills (Ellickson and Whistler, 2000, 80; Anderson et al., 2003, 367; Aleman and 
Calvo, 2008, 17). These arguments find mixed support. There is positive relation of seniority and 
legislative success in the studies of the US context (Moore and Thomas, 1991, 968; Ellickson and 
Whistler, 2000, 95), as well as in the research of Argentinian case (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 28). 
However, Anderson et al. (2003, 378) fail to find significant support for the relations for seniority, 
although it provides significant results for freshmen struggling to pass their bills. Bratton and Haynie 
(1999, 665) find seniority significant only for a few cases. When measuring seniority, it is difficult to 
account for informal connections and previous experience in the field, i.e., not being a legislator but 
working in tight relationships with them, which may be cofounding factors and may distort seniority 
accuracy. 
The race may also be a factor contributing to legislative success. However, the evidence in support is 
mixed. Bratton and Haynie (1999, 671) find significant support to black representatives less likely to 
pass their bill in three out of five researched states. The advantage of being white in Ellickson and 
Whistler (2000, 90) is significant only for male. 
Education's higher levels may lead to more considerable policy expertise, hence, drafting the attractive 
bill. More educated legislators may be more successful lawmakers (Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013, 
985). The effects of this variable are mixed. Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 986) find education not 
significant for bills passing. Ellickson and Whistler’s (2000, 92, 95) results indicate that education is a 
mild but inconsistent asset, which, in their research, is significant only for males, despite they indeed 
find highly educated MPs initiate more bills than less educated ones. 
The leadership of any kind gives advantages. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 17) and Anderson et al. (2003, 
378) argue and find the support that bills initiated by chairs of parliamentary bodies are more successful 
opposite to rank-and-file MPs. The theory behind this is that the chairs may have a better understanding 
of legislative preferences. Moreover, chairs can use the institutional advantages to push the bills of their 
authorship. Leaders of parties or parliamentary factions may also use their influence to collect votes. 
However, Anderson et al. (2003, 367) theorize the opposite effect. They argue that party leaders do not 
have time to introduce bills, and the poor number of proposed laws make us expect party leaders to be 
less successful as a lawmaker. This argumentation seems illogical since the low number of initiated 
bills is not a precondition for their failure.  
Ideology. Extremists tend to pursue non-centrist agendas regardless of chance for success (Aleman and 
Calvo, 2008, 14). Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 83) expect a negative relationship between ideological 
extremism and success in bill passage. They find significant positive relations for bill passage and 
ideologically moderate women.  
Informal connections. Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 81) generalize studies on organizational 
networking, implying that friendship and trust among representatives should increase legislative 
success.  
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While studying legislative success determinants, the researchers have not tried to fit them against the 
regime type. When one does that, it turns out that the existing literature mostly looks at the stable 
regimes7 and not the ones in transition. Possibly, the legislative success determinants could have 
behaved differently, and the current patterns are inherent only to stable regimes.  
The other observation is that the existing literature looks only at the majority-minority split, which is 
operationalized as the interactions between the parties. However, the inter-party mode of interaction is 
not always the dominant one. So, to illustrate the conflict between the legislators, one is better to refer 
to the government-opposition conflict. Arguably, the government and opposition are better 
operationalization to identify legislative success determinants in the context where majority and 
minority do not coincide with the government-opposition split. 
These remarks point to the vast research gap – whether the mentioned legislative success determinants 
are significant during democratization and autocratization processes and whether these determinants 
differ for the periods of stability, democratization, and autocratization. Within the limits of this research, 
it is impossible to fill this gap fully. However, I aim to address a part of it and concentrate on the 
legislative success determinants in autocratizing states. 
4. Research Hypotheses  
Guided by the gaps, in this chapter, I build the theoretical expectations uniting the body of knowledge 
on autocratizing regimes, legislative success, and opposition. I formulate six hypotheses, which try to 
explain legislative success. Note, one could form more hypotheses in line with the determinants 
considered in the previous chapter. However, I stay focused on the determinants related to or interacting 
with the cosponsorship groups since one of those – the opposition – is the primary focus of this research. 
In autocratizing states, one would expect that the opposition proposals are ignored. That may as well 
apply to some democratic parliamentary systems with a stable regime. One can argue that the 
opposition’s ability to make the laws is not about the type of the regime and its dynamics, but about the 
institutional system (Hix and Noury, 2016). Indeed, the legislative framework with the majority 
requirement for the government formation makes the ruling party or coalition a sole dictator of the 
legislative agenda and successful proposals. So, in many cases, the representatives of minorities do not 
have the available opportunity to have their bill adopted without help from the government.  
However, even in an institutional framework where the opposition lacks the majority, the opposition’s 
bill may still be supported by the government. It demonstrates the inclusion of minority interests. Note, 
the inclusion may take the other form, e.g., adoption of the opposition’s amendments to the 
governmental bills, or when the government makes policies concerning minorities without 
cosponsoring together with the opposition’s representatives. Arguably, in stable democracies, the 
minority inclusion manifests itself in the mentioned other forms; and the adoption of the opposition’s 
bills is not as vital for democratic stability. On the other hand, in the autocratizing states, where the 
opposition tends to be ignored, the minority interests are vulnerable to governmental abuse, and bills 
initiation is the most pronounced means to attract attention to minority interests.   
So, in the polities with democratic backsliding, it is particularly reasonable to expect that opposition’s 
bills are less likely to find support than the government ones. Hence, hypothesis 1 suggests the 
following. 
H1: Bills sponsored by the opposition have a lower probability of being successful than 
the bills sponsored by the government. 
 
7 Regime stability is observed for Mexican case within 2000-2009 (Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013), Argentinian case 
is within 1983-2001 (Aleman and Calvo, 2008), and US cases within 1993-1994 (Anderson et al., 2003). For 
Bratton and Haynie (1999) and Ellickson and Whistler’s (2000), it is impossible to account for the indicator’s 
movement. The observations of the former consist of all bills introduced in 1969, 1979, and 1989. The latter 
considered some of the proposals initiated in 1991. 
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Aleman and Calvo (2008, 15) distinguish between within-party and cross-party cosponsorship, and state 
that cross-party cosponsorship may imply consensus, which may help the bill to pass. The same relates 
to the increase in the number of cosponsors. The underlying argument is that the more MPs work on 
the proposal, the more support they can gather among their colleagues. It speaks to the interpersonal 
relations in the parliament. The other side of the coin is that if the bill is potentially successful, then the 
more MPs would like to join its drafting since they can later position that bill as their achievement. So, 
the expectation is that the increase in the number of cosponsors positively influences the probability of 
the bill’s adoption. Hypothesis 2 and 3 test Aleman and Calvo’s (2008, 15) finding in a different 
environment and from the perspective of the government-opposition split. 
H2: Bills of mixed cosponsorship have a higher probability of success than the bills 
sponsored by the government. 
H3: With the increase in the number of cosponsors, the bill’s probability of passing 
increases. 
The other relation to look at is the interaction of the number of cosponsors and the initiator’s status 
categories. They may be different. One can assume that the more cosponsors for the opposition’s bills, 
the likelihood of its adoption increases. The reason is that the opposition representatives need to 
persuade the majority of MPs to support the bill. It requires resources like reputation, personal relations, 
to say nothing of the bill’s issue, which should be likable and relevant. On the other hand, the 
governmental sponsor already has support from the colleagues. The only issue possibly preventing the 
governmental bill’s success is its content.  
H4: The increase in the number of cosponsors effects various cosponsorship groups 
differently. 
The approximation of the elections is the other possible determinant of the legislative success. On 
explanation is that, with the approach of the elections, MPs pass more bills since they need to conquer 
the electorate. The other possible reason is that MPs need time to draft and adopt the proposals. At the 
beginning of the term, they have less time to work out the bills than towards the end of the parliamentary 
term. Hypothesis 5 tests the argument. 
H5: With the approach of elections, the probability of the bill’s success increases. 
The other relation to test is whether the approach of elections influences bills of different cosponsorship 
groups differently. Potentially, the governing party or coalition should adopt more bills of their 
sponsorship. One reason is that the government wants to show to the electorate that they are efficient 
and useful. In some cases, the adoption of the long-awaited bill is a good advertisement. The other 
reason is to secure the status quo in some areas if the opposition comes to power after the elections. So, 
hypothesis 6 tests the discussed interaction. 
H6: With the approach of elections, the likelihood of opposition and government bills 
adoption is different. 
5. Ukraine: Case-Relevant Information 
This chapter performs several purposes. The first section discusses the universe of cases and explains 
the case selection. The second section gives a brief overview of Ukraine’s democratization endeavors, 
which is relevant to fit the case in the regime types alterations framework. The third section has a 
functional purpose. Besides making the reader familiar with Ukraine’s legislative procedure, it helps to 
understand the logic of the decisions made while managing the data (more – the Data Management 
chapter). The last section, based on Ukraine’s institutional framework and opposition types indicators, 
defines the dominant opposition type, which is required in testing hypotheses 1-4. 
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Case Selection 
The universe of cases for this research covers autocratizing polities in the middle range of the V-Dem’s 
regime type scale, i.e., they belong to electoral democracies or possibly can be assigned to this group 
(Lührmann et al., 2020, 24-26). Autocratization in regimes that were democratic matters more than 
further deterioration in already autocratic regimes (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019, 1104).  
The cases to consider, from 2009 through 2019 could be Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, 
Ukraine, and Serbia (see Figure 1). These are European countries, which had a significant decrease in 
their indicator in the Liberal Democracy Index for these ten years.  
However, this research concentrates on one case – Ukraine. I argue that it is a typical case (Seawright 
and Gerring, 2008) in the case universe. Ukraine has a gradual decline of the Liberal Democracy Index 
indicator, although it starts at a lower level. It suggests that the conclusions based on the moderate case 
may be generalized to similar moderate cases and more extreme, e.g., Poland with a steep decline.  
 
Regime Type and Its Alterations 
The alterations of the regime type in Ukraine appear to coincide with its system of government. Ukraine 
has a semi-presidential system. However, the dominance of either the president’s or parliament’s 
powers has been fluctuating. In these terms, one can divide the history of Ukraine into four periods. 
Noticeably, when the president’s powers prevail over the parliament’s ones, many of the components 
of the Liberal Democracy Index decrease compared to the previous period (except for the period before 
the 1996 Constitution).  
Since the 1991 establishment of the president’s position, the presidential powers prevailed over the 
parliamentary ones. From its onset, the county had a highly presidentialised semi-presidential regime 
(Bader, 2010, 1092). Its other characteristic is a “competitive authoritarianism” – elections took place 
regularly. However, they were utterly unfair and accompanied by undemocratic practices (Way, 2005, 
131). Kubicek (2001, 117) argues that under the circumstances back in the 1990s, the democratic 
consolidation has remained elusive and susceptible to a variety of problems – a weak civil society and 
weak political parties, regional divisions, unstable political institutions and a lack of the rule of law. 
According to Wise and Brown (1998, 127), the challenges posing a threat to the consolidation of 
Ukrainian democracy were poor economic performance, increased dissatisfaction and malaise 
throughout the electorate, redomination by Russia, and the growing power of criminal elements. 
Way (2005, 137) argues that the oligarchic system set up in the late 1990s, although contributing to 
democratic backsliding (Kubicek, 2001, 117), enabled the development of opposition, which sparkled 
the 2004 revolution. The country translated into a new period, and democratization started. Due to the 
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adoption in 2006 of constitutional amendments package, the institutional setting for party development 
improved, and their weight increased. Henceforth, cabinets of ministers were formed by parliamentary 
majorities, consisting of party coalitions, and a high number of crucial appointments both in and outside 
government required parliament approval. As a result, Ukraine acquired a regime with a more even 
balance of presidential and prime-ministerial powers (Bader, 2010, 1089, 1098). 
In post-post-communism, the success of the democratic transition, as Kubicek (2009, 325) argues, 
depend on “just good leaders or the will of the people for a new form of government.” The leaders of 
the Orange revolution could not manage to keep the coalition together, which enabled the comeback of 
the previous elites prone to autocratizing the country. In 2010, the Constitutional Court canceled out 
the 2006 reform, and the state returned to the presidential-parliamentary system. Throughout the 
Yanukovych presidency (2010-2014), Yushchenko’s democratic progress (2005-2010) rolled back. 
However, after the 2014 revolution, the parliamentary-presidential system has been returned and is the 
current system of government. Delcour and Wolczuk (2015, 472) argue that Russia’s direct threat to 
Ukraine since 2014 has served to consolidate Ukraine’s democracy. However, the pursue of wide-
ranging democratization is crippled by the national security priority and a deep economic crisis. 
Hence, for many democracy indicators, the corner dates are 1996, 2004, 2010, 2014, plus-minus a year 
for the changes to happen and be noticed. Notably, that increases tend to occur in 2004 and decrease – 
in 1996 and 2010. 2014 is dubious, arguably, due to the argument proposed by Delcour and Wolczuk 
(2015, 472), – the pro-democratic improvements of the Revolution of Dignity get lost amidst the 
conflict-induced deterioration. Further, I describe the situation within the period under research on 
average (see the dynamics of indices in Figure 2), not paying much attention to the decreases around 
2010, when Yanukovych, who pushed the autocratizing agenda, became the president. 
Further, I base the discussion on the V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index. I use its components and look 
at their dynamics to highlight the status quo (sometimes changing) within the period under research – 
2007-2019 (explained in Data Management). Analyzing by components makes it easier to relate the 
results of this study to the universe of cases. For clarity or to underline the context, I occasionally refer 
to periods before that. This approach enables one to highlight the components, where democratization 
lags or autocratization evolves, which, in turn, may affect minority rights and the parliamentary 
opposition from the perspective of the consensus democracy.  
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Electoral Democracy Index. Regarding the freedom of expression and alternative information (scale 
– 0 to 18) during the reference period, Ukraine’s score has decreased from 0.87 to 0.689, hitting 0.64 in 
2014 and 2017. One may group the components contributing to that around two issues – censorship 
(government censorship effort, media self-censorship, harassment of journalists) and freedom of 
expression on different levels (freedoms of discussion and academic and cultural expression, 
print/broadcast media perspectives, print/broadcast media critical, media bias). 
Regarding the censorship, the conclusion is that the government attempts to censor sensitive issues and 
that the media does not extensively cover politically sensitive topics. There is also the harassment of 
journalists, i.e., those who offend powerful actors are forced to stop, but others manage to continue 
practicing journalism freely for long periods. 
The freedoms of expression have plunged from top positions in 2014. Since then, there are minor 
restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated 
cases or only linked to soft sanctions. However, as a rule, there is no intervention or harassment in case 
of political statements. One can relate such a change to the Revolution of Dignity and Russian 
aggression when pro-Russian opinions started receiving social disapproval and be mildly persecuted by 
the government (Way, 2019, 53-54).  From 2010, the leading media started to systematically ignore at 
least one political perspective that is important in society, which intensified after 2014. In 2010, 
government criticism by the media decreased. There were outlets, which never find faults with the 
government. However, from 2013, the situation has been improving. During 2010-2014, the media 
covered opposition more or less impartially, but they gave only negative or no coverage to at least one 
newsworthy party or candidate. During other periods under research, the opposition media coverage 
was better, yet too much attention went to the government. 
So, regarding the opportunities of the nongovernmental minority in the context of the freedom of 
expression and alternative information, one may conclude that there are governmental and media 
limitations regarding sensitive issues, which, among other things, can be opposition related. 
During the reference period, the freedom of association (scale – 0 to 1) has fallen from 0.85 to 0.63. 
One may group the components around the events affecting their change – those decreased in 2010 
(opposition parties’ autonomy), those dropped in 2014 (party ban, elections multiparty), and those 
fallen in both 2010 and 2014 (barriers to parties and CSO repression). The meaning for the opposition 
parties’ autonomy on average indicates that most significant opposition parties are autonomous and 
independent of the ruling regime. 
The components party ban and elections multiparty have mainly been influenced by the political 
responsibility people put on the Party of Regions for the Revolution’s victims and the Russian 
aggression. The party members, to continue their political activity, were to create or join the other 
parties. Later in 2015, the Party of Regions allies, the Communist Party of Ukraine, was legally banned 
in connection with decommunization (Law of Ukraine No. 317-VIII, 2015). Besides these facts, there 
is no other restriction preventing political associations. Although 2014 events have influenced the CSO 
entry and exit component, its period average indicates that the government’s control over civil society 
is minimal and, even if the government wanted to ban some of them, it would be impossible due to the 
lack of resources or political expedience. 
Regarding barriers to parties, the meaning for the period on average indicates modest restrictions while 
forming a new party, which in practice translates into the occasional political harassment while creating 
a party, and since 2014 the impossibility to form a new party due to technical reasons connected with 
not controlling the full territory of Ukraine by the state. The period average for CSO 
repression indicates weak governmental attempts to pursue repressions. The temporal fall in 2014 is 
due to the authority’s oppression of the activists during the Revolution of Dignity. 
 
8 From now on, lower scores mean bad for democracy and vice versa. 
9 To make the text concise, I do not include a confidence rating.  
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So, there are minor limitations to the freedom of association for the nongovernmental minority. 
Notably, the change of the ruling parties has not changed that situation. It suggests that the freedom 
association limitations do not depend on the government in place. 
The clean elections index is not stable. It is fluctuating from 0.6 in 2009 to 0.34 in 2018, becoming 0.55 
in 2019 (scale – 0 to 1). The components may be grouped around election management (election voter 
registry, EMB autonomy, EMB capacity) and holding elections (election vote-buying, elections free and 
fair, election government intimidation, non-state electoral violence, election other voting 
irregularities). 
Regarding election management, the Election Management Body has been partial to the government on 
critical issues that influence the outcome of elections. It is unclear how many potential flaws there are 
in the voter registry and their impact on the electoral results. Moreover, the Election Management Body 
in 2014 has partial deficits in resources in the uncontrolled territories and cannot hold elections there. 
Regarding holding elections, the components show the following. Vote buying is non-systematic but 
rather common in Ukraine. The usage of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-
stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes are frequent. The competition and freedom 
of participation are substantial. However, there may be sporadic instances of harassment and 
intimidation by the government directed at opposition groups. Non-state electoral violence happened 
only during the 2014 elections on the territories not controlled by the Ukrainian government; however, 
it is not spread on the peaceful regions. 
In terms of election management, the government can manipulate the election outcomes since the 
opportunities allow. In terms of holding elections, both sides may make efforts towards rigging the 
election outcome. In the end, the government has more opportunities. However, the actions of both 
governmental and nongovernmental parties depend on their honest intentions. 
As for the elected officials’ index, I do not discuss its components since, throughout the countries’ 
existence, the index’s score is the highest possible. The same situation is with the suffrage – every 
citizen of full age has the right to vote with a few exceptions when it comes to legal incapacity. Elected 
official index and suffrage also do not indicate any disadvantage for the nongovernmental minority. 
Liberal Component Index. The equality before the law and individual liberty index is incredibly 
sensitive to the 2014 and subsequent conflict-related events, with all its components decreasing around 
that time (property rights, freedom of domestic and foreign movement, access to justice, freedom from 
torture, freedom from political killings, freedom from forced labor, freedom of religion, transparent 
laws with predictable enforcement, rigorous and impartial public administration). From an average of 
0.8 (scale – 0 to 1), from 2014 and on, the index has decreased to an average of 0.5. 
The situation on the uncontrolled territories affects the general score for Ukraine. There, the residents, 
unlike residents of the other Ukrainian areas, have impediments to movement, property rights 
exercising, and access to justice. Notably, access to justice for women is higher than for men. While, 
for the former, justice is usually observed, for the latter, it is inconsistent. Forced labor is more observed 
for men than for women, although it is infrequent and found only in the criminal underground. 
Before 2014, torture and political killings were practiced in a few isolated cases and were not incited or 
approved by top government leaders. In 2014, such practices turned into occasional. However, with 
time the situation improves with the lower intensity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as 
incorporation into the state armed forces or disbandment of the paramilitary groups (Burdyha, 2018). 
Before 2014, public authorities fully respected religion’s freedom, and the component found relative 
stability in the medium-high range. The deterioration of religious freedoms is caused, first, by the 
persecutions of religious minorities in the occupied territories and, second, by local conflicts between 
different patriarchies of the Eastern Orthodox Church, mainly due to the desire to get out of the Moscow 
Patriarchate control (US Department of State, 2019). 
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The public officials approach the law enforcement arbitrary and biased approach. Nepotism and 
cronyism are widely spread in Ukraine. Moreover, there is a problem of selective law enforcement and 
the absence of coherency and stability in the legislation. 
The equality before the law and individual liberty index indicates many liberty problems. However, one 
should keep in mind that those problems are predominantly clustered in the uncontrolled territories, 
which the government cannot hold responsibility. In the context of this research, the law predictability 
component deserves attention. It speaks to the argument that changing governments are not sustainable 
in their policies, and each time may turn their strategies in the opposite direction. It may entail minority 
infringements and imply the pro-governmental interest serving policies. 
Since Ukraine’s independence, judicial constraints on the executive index has been persistently going 
down, although with situational improvements. Within the reference period, this index has been 
predominantly fluctuating within the low range scores. The situation leaves much to be desired. The 
component executive respects constitution indicates the executive’s capacity to violate the constitution 
with only occasional legal consequences. Compliance with the judiciary component points out that the 
government only seldom complies with decisions by other courts with which it disagrees. There is a 
similar situation with compliance with high courts’ decisions on issues on which the government 
disagrees. Within the reference period, the components for high and lower courts’ independence went 
down in 2009 and increased after 2014 and 2014. Still, these fluctuations occur in the middle-low range, 
implying that, in cases of government importance, the courts usually rule out favorable to the 
government. 
Legislative constraints on the executive index, within the reference period, has been going down from 
high to middle-low range and then leveling up at the middle-high range. It means that the legislature 
and government agencies can rarely fully oversight or investigate the executives. The components 
for legislature questions officials in practice indicates that the legislature routinely questions executive 
branch officials. However, when it comes to executive violations, the prosecution and final ruling on 
the executive officer-related case is unlikely. The components for executive oversight, legislature 
investigates in practice, legislature opposition parties point out at uncertainty in an investigation of the 
government in case of unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity by the prosecutors or the legislature. 
Also, considering that opposition parties may occasionally investigate or oversee the government, the 
government is likely to get away with its violations. 
The nongovernmental minority is in an unequal position with the government. The courts are not 
independent. Moreover, the government is unlikely to be investigated by the parliament even if the 
opposition insists. 
The major takeaway from the regime overview is that nongovernmental minority interests may be 
neglected for the sake of the government’s ones. It is not necessarily true for every case. However, the 
institutional framework and previous experience assume the subordinate position of the 
nongovernmental minority, which fails to meet the consensus democracy principles (Lijphart, 2012, 
32). 
Legislative Procedure 
According to article 75 of the Constitution, the only legislative body in Ukraine is its parliament – 
Verkhovna Rada (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Chapter IV of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine thoroughly describes the legislative procedure (Law of Ukraine No. 1861-
VI, 2010). The legislative initiative belongs to three subjects – the president, MPs, or the Cabinet of 
Ministers. It is exercised by submitting to the Verkhovna Rada of bills and regulations, drafts of other 
acts of the Verkhovna Rada, suggestions and amendments to the bills. In this research, I concentrate on 
bills initiated by the MPs, i.e., private member bills. 
Before becoming the law, the bill needs to pass several stages. First, it should be preliminarily approved 
at the committee. Then, it should be included in the agenda, and pass from one to three readings. In the 
end, the MPs should adopt the bill as a whole. 
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At the preliminary consideration, the respective committee decides whether the bill meets all the 
regulatory requirements. There are two possible results. First, the bill may be sent back to its initiator – 
at this point, the proceeding of the bill stops. Second, the committee may recommend including the bill 
into the agenda. The initiator may voluntarily and freely withdraw the bill if it is not yet included in the 
agenda. If the bill is included in the agenda, the parliament’s support for withdrawal is required. The 
recommendation to include in the agenda does not mean automatic inclusion. The session and week 
agendas may change, depending on the Conciliation Board’s decision10. 
After the first reading, there are four outcomes for the bill: 
1. It is adopted as a basis and is submitted to the responsible committee for the second reading 
preparation. 
2. The bill is rejected. 
3. The bill is returned for revision to its initiator or the responsible committee. 
4. Publication of the bill for the public discussion with the repeated first hearing. 
If MPs decide to follow the shortened procedure, they may adopt the bill as a basis and as a whole 
during the same day. 
Between the readings, bills may be finalized at the committees if MPs submit suggestions or 
amendments. The responsible committee considers suggestions and amendments, accepts, partially 
accepts, or denies them, and then recommends adopting the finalized text during the second or third 
reading. If any MP disagrees with the committee’s decision on any suggestion or amendment, one can 
demand its consideration and voting at the plenary hearing.  So, it may happen that due to the successful 
voting on MP’s demand for the suggestions or amendments, the finalized text alters before being voted 
as a whole. 
There are five outcomes of the second reading: 
1. It is adopted in the second reading and is submitted to the responsible committee for the third 
reading preparation. 
2. The bill is rejected. 
3. The bill is adopted in the second reading and as a whole. 
4. The partial adoption of the bill. Then, the non-agreed on parts are submitted for revision to the 
responsible committee. 
5. The bill is returned for revision to the responsible committee for the repeated second reading. 
Reading the bill three times is rather exceptional. To be concise, I do not describe its outcomes 
considering that they are similar to those of the second reading. As a rule, bills are voted in two readings, 
being adopted as a basis in the first one and as a whole in the second one. Then, the Chairman of 
Verkhovna Rada signs them, and so does the president, if one approves. The president may veto the 
bill, and then the MPs can override it by a qualified majority vote. However, I do not dwell on that since 
it is out of the research context.  
With this fluctuation of the system of government, the legislative process has not been changing much. 
The only thing appearing during the presidential-parliamentary system is the National Bank’s 
opportunity to be the bill’s initiator. However, this fact does not affect this research. 
Dominant Opposition Type 
In this section, I point-by-point refer to previously discussed indicators of opposition mode and its 
institutional determinants and place them against Ukrainian background to argue about the country’s 
expected dominant opposition mode. 
Modes indicators. The inter-party mode indicators are ministerial recruitment from the parliament, the 
existence of coalition agreement, and cohesion. The first indicator is not relevant for Ukraine since it is 
 
10 It is an advisory body in the parliament, consisting of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the First 
Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Chairmen of factions and groups with the right 
to vote, and the Chairmen of Committees with the right of an advisory vote. 
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impossible to be the MP and the cabinet member at the same time. However, the MPs often take 
positions in the Cabinet, although they cease to be legislators. Regarding, coalition agreements, if there 
is a necessity to form a coalition, they are optional. However, the partnering factions usually put their 
agenda on paper (see Appendix 1). Coalition cohesion in Ukraine leaves much to be desired. Although 
coalitions do function within some period during the parliament’s convocation, they often fall apart, 
leading to government change. 
The cross-party mode’s indicator is influential committees, which is not the case of Ukraine. There, 
committees often do not play a considerable role in considering legislation. The plenary sessions 
frequently reject their recommendation, even when a committee assesses a proposal unconstitutional 
(European parliament, 9, 2016). Moreover, the interparty mode may transpire to the committees since 
they form based on proportional faction quotas. (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). 
The non-party opposition indicators are the high frequency of the rejected governmental bills, the high 
legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, and the influential role of investigative commissions. 
The share of the Cabinet bills rejected in Ukraine is lower than of private members’ bills (“Shcho 
napratsiuvaly Ukrayinski parlamentari za 4 roky?”, 2018), which does not look like the stiff opposition 
to the Cabinet. The majority of MPs may also support the notion of no confidence and dismiss the 
Cabinet, i.e., there is no point in interacting in the non-party opposition mode where there is an 
opportunity to change the government. Moreover, the primary task of the Ukrainian Cabinet is to be the 
executive, not the lawmaker. Concerning “backbenchers,” I argue that the term does not apply to the 
Ukrainian system since the executive and legislative branches are separated. So, this indicator is void 
of content. Regarding the investigative committees, in 2009, the Constitutional Court found the law 
regulating their activities unconstitutional. Thus, within most of the period under research, that indicator 
could not contribute to the non-party mode (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine No. 20-
rp/2009, 2009). 
Indicators of the intra-party mode are the MPs’ defection from the party line in the roll call voting and 
committee activities, public criticism of own party, party-switching. The mentioned behavior among 
legislators is not exceptional in Ukraine. In convocations three to eight, 42% of MPs have changed their 
faction in the parliament at least once. The average number of factions changing among the “switchers” 
is 2.5. Notably, that MPs elected in the single-member districts have switched the faction more often 
than the MPs elected in the party list. It, to some extent, is influenced by the “imperative mandate” 
active in convocations five, six, and eight. It is possible to recall the MP by the political parties, which 
applies only to the MPs elected in the party list (Krymeniuk, 2019). The imperative mandate is likely 
to influence party cohesion in terms of defection in the roll-call voting. The evidence for that is the 
network analyses of the roll call voting of the adopted bills in the fourth and sixth session of the eighth 
convocation, which indicate several stable defectors amid governmental factions (Ostapchuk, n.d.; 
Nadelniuk, n.d.). 
Institutional determinants. The form of government in Ukraine depends on the outcome of the 
elections. It may be either a single-party majority or a multiparty majority (during the period under 
consideration – I talk about it in section Data Management, – it has been the latter). However, the 
expectation about the type of split in the Ukrainian parliament is not straightforward since the referred 
above Hix and Noury (2016, 251) do not explicitly discuss semi-presidential systems, which is the 
regime type in Ukraine. I look at the theoretical models of legislative politics, which these authors use 
while building their theory. Since in Ukraine, a particular legislator or group of legislators, i.e., the 
majority, can restrict the agenda (more – in section Legislative Process), the theoretical model of 
legislative politics leans towards “cartel agenda model.” According to Hix and Noury (2016, 265) 
findings, the legislations with this model observe the government-opposition split, i.e., the relations 
within the inter-party mode.  
This opinion can also find support by comparison with the countries’ regimes used in Hix and Noury’s 
(2016, 253) analysis. For example, France and Poland, which have both semi-presidential systems, are 
considered as those with parliamentary regimes. There, like in Ukraine, the government (via the 
president) can dissolve the parliament, and subsequently, enforce party discipline. Hence, Ukraine, by 
analogy, may also be defined as the country with the parliamentary regime.  
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The electoral system in Ukraine during the period under research11 has been different. There was the 
closed-list PR system for the election of sixth convocation and the mixed system for the seventh and 
eighth convocations (Law of Ukraine No. 1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011). The 
Ukrainian mixed system is when half of the MPs are elected according to the closed-list PR system, 
and another half is elected according to the first-past-the-post (FPTP). In FPTP, the candidates can be 
independent or receive support from a party. Despite the possibility of minor candidate-centered 
settings, the Ukrainian electoral system is closer to the party-centered-settings since the party defines 
its list and supports the district candidates. 
Moreover, in the parliaments elected according to the mixed system, FPTP MPs in most of the cases 
joined governmental factions, so that the number of FPTP MPs exceeded that of PR-list MPs (Viedrov, 
2017). This evidence points to the party-dependency of the FPTP MPs. Altogether, these characteristics 
contribute to the inter-party mode.   
Regarding district magnitude, in Ukraine, they have more or less the same size12, and it has not changed 
over time (Law of Ukraine No. 1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011; Law of Ukraine 
No. 396-IX, 2020). So, this factor is likely not to influence the Ukrainian case. 
The candidate selection process in Ukraine is extremely-party centered. The PR-list and FPTP 
candidates are decided at party meetings in the manner prescribed by the Party Rules. An independent 
candidate may be included in the PR-list and receive support at the district levels (Law of Ukraine No. 
1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011; Law of Ukraine No. 396-IX, 2020). Hence, there 
is more support for the inter-party mode provided the MP’s intentions to run in the next elections from 
that party. 
After the analysis of the indicators of opposition types and their institutional determinants, almost 
everything points toward the inter-party mode dominance in the Ukrainian parliament. When referring 
to the opposition in Ukraine, I specifically talk about factions’ confrontation, particularly governmental 
factions versus nongovernmental factions. 
The other mode, which may arise from time to time, is the intra-party mode. Unfortunately, in this 
research, I cannot account for its mild indicators, i.e., defection in voting or party public criticism. Thus, 
it is one of the limitations. However, when it comes to party-switching – the most explicit manifestation 
of disagreement with the party line, I account for it and change the MP’s status if necessary (more – in 
section Data Management). 
5. Data Management 
For this research, I use open government data from the Ukrainian parliament web-portal13. 
Unfortunately, there is no single data set suitable for research purposes. So, I manage ten data sets, 
arranging the existing variables, and adding the new ones according to the necessities14.  
 
11 In 2019, Ukraine adopted new electoral legislation that is quite different from the previous one. From 2020 on, 
the electoral system is going to be a mix of closed-list and open-list proportional representation. If the party passes 
the 5% threshold, the first nine nominees in the national list, as well as nominees receiving the compensatory seat, 
get into the parliament according to the closed-list PR. The latter is for those elected in the electoral regions (Law 
of Ukraine No. 396-IX, 2020). Although the majority of the MPs are to be elected through open-list PR, I argue 
that the electoral system still tends to be party-centered since the right to nominate candidates is reserved 
exclusively to political parties, and there is no possibility of self-nomination. Hence, the conclusions will be as 
relevant for the convocations elected according to the new electoral legislation, as for the previous ones.    
12 After the 2014 Russian aggression, it became fully or partially impossible to have the elections at some districts. 
At those 12 districts, where it is possible to conduct the elections partially, far fewer voters have supported the 
MPs elected according to the FPTP system. However, I do not take into consideration this exception since it is 
not a regular feature. 
13https://data.rada.gov.ua 
14 R script with the code and the comments and the raw data are attached (see Appendix 5).  
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I use data covering convocations six through eight (2007-2019). The primary reason is an excessively 
volatile party landscape, which was tamed after the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections. (Bader, 
2019, 1089). The other motive is that the constitution edition before 2006 has not had the clause for the 
coalition’s existence. It appeared with the change to the parliamentary-presidential system in 2006, with 
the coalition being responsible for the prime minister’s nomination. The formal requirement for the 
existence of the coalition means by default that there is the opposition. 
Note that within 2010-2014, the then constitution edition in-force did not contain the clause on the 
coalition, and Ukraine had the presidential-parliamentary system again. However, I still analyze this 
period since there was an open confrontation between the factions supporting the appointment of the 
prime minister and the Cabinet. 
One may logically divide the data management into three parts: preparing data on MPs, preparing data 
on bills, and defining variables in the base data set. I code separately for each convocation and then 
unite everything into one dataset to have as many cases as possible.  
While preparing data on MPs, I use four data sets. The first one is a data set on faction (or group) 
switching and is mutual for all convocations. It has variables on MPs names, the names of factions or 
groups to which MPs belonged, and the period of that belonging. Three other data sets contain general 
information about MPs and are separate for each convocation I analyze. The data set on MPs’ general 
information includes variables on MPs’ names, genders, and IDs. Here and below, I name only those 
variables, which I use in the analysis or need for management purposes.  
After merging the data sets on faction switching and MPs general information by MPs’ names, I receive 
extended versions of data set on faction (or group) switching (one for each convocation). Then, I create 
a variable, defining MPs’ belonging to governmental or nongovernmental factions at each period. In 
doing this, I am guided by coalition compositions or factions appointing the government. So, I define 
MPs from the coalition (or those who voted for the prime minister) as governmental. In their turn, MPs, 
who belonged to groups and were not coalition members (or did not appoint the government), are coded 
as nongovernmental, except two groups in the seventh convocation since then they belonged to the 
coalition (see Appendix 1 and 2).  
The prepared data set on MPs contains variables for MP’s name, MP’s ID, MP’s gender, MP’s faction 
or group belonging, the period of this belonging (separate variables for beginning and end), faction or 
group’s governmental or nongovernmental status, and convocation number. Note that if MPs switch 
faction or group belonging within convocation, their names repeat with the general information. Then, 
the switching MP cases vary by variables for faction or group belonging, the period of this belonging 
(separate variables for beginning and end), and faction or group’s governmental or nongovernmental 
status. 
While preparing data on bills, I use six data sets – three data sets on the events of the plenary sessions 
(one for each convocation) and three data sets on all registered bills and regulations within the 
convocation (one for each). Before moving on with the details of the data management, I need to address 
the applied restriction.  
In this research, I can analyze only the private member bills that have been voted during plenary 
sessions. The cause is the changing nature of the governmental or nongovernmental status of MPs. It is 
not stable for two reasons. First, MPs can leave or join the faction anytime. Second, during one 
convocation, there may be governments formed by the opposing factions. So, the governmental bill, at 
the time of its initiation, may become nongovernmental at the time of its plenary voting. 
Hence, to see whether the governmental or nongovernmental bills pass or not, I need to choose the stage 
of the proceeding, connected to a specific time point, which can show bills’ initiators status at the 
moment of passing or rejection. As described in the Legislative Procedure section, bills may not succeed 
at several stages of the proceeding. Unfortunately, the data sets do not include the time of the bills’ 
rejection (withdrawal, sending to the initiator, ignoration to add to the agenda) at any other stage than 
the plenary session. Therefore, I drop down the bills, which have not reached at least the first reading. 
Thus, I go on in the research with the bills supported or rejected at the plenary sessions. 
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Data sets on the events of plenary sessions encompass votings, registrations, and speeches. First, I filter 
for votings. Then, I filter out, when the voting is for amendments and suggestions15, regulations, 
inclusion into agenda, signal, or ranking voting for bills, voting for laws while overriding president’s 
veto, and other procedural decisions. Within the proceed data set, there is no variable for the bill’s ID, 
which I need further. However, the bill’s ID is a part of the bill’s name, which is there. So, I extract the 
bill’s ID from the bill’s name and create a new variable. It appears that bills’ IDs repeat because there 
have been several votings for the same bill, e.g., first, second, repeated readings. I filter for the last 
voting, i.e., if the bill passes in both first and second readings, I leave the latter. So, the final list includes 
unique bills, voted as a basis or/and as a whole. Thus, the managed data set on the bill’s voted at the 
plenary sessions contains variables for the bill’s ID, bill’s name, and the date and time of voting. 
Data sets on all registered bills and regulations within the convocation include, among others, variables 
on bill or regulation’s ID, its issue, its initiators, the status of initiators (president, PM, MP), stage of 
bill or regulation’s proceeding. First, I filter out all regulations and the bills initiated by the president or 
the prime minister since they are not in the scope of this research. Second, considering whether the bill 
has been adopted in the final reading as a whole, I recode the stage of the bill’s proceeding – whether 
the bill passed or failed. Then, I flatten the nested data frames of the variable initiators to receive vectors 
of MPs IDs, who have initiated the corresponding bill.  
To unite the data on bills, I merge the data sets on the bill’s voted at the plenary sessions, and the data 
sets on all registered bills for each convocation by bill’s ID, leaving only the cases from the data sets 
on the bill’s voted at the plenary sessions. Further, I use this data sets as a base (one for each 
convocation). Hence, the prepared data set on bills includes variables for the bill’s ID, date and time of 
its voting, bill’s name, legislative success, bill’s initiators, bill’s issue.  
In the last part of the data management, I finalize the base data sets. Using the variable for MPs IDs 
in the extended versions of data sets on faction (or group) switching, in the base data sets, I create 
variables to define the status of the bill in terms of its initiators belonging to (non-)governmental faction. 
Similarly, I create a variable to determine the gender of bills’ initiators. Then, from the variable with 
MPs IDs, I calculate and create a separate variable for the number of initiators, which is a similar 
Ukrainian term for sponsors. I also create a variable with the date of the parliamentary elections 
following the respective convocation. From it, I calculate two other variables – how many days before 
elections the bill has been voted and its squared value divided by a thousand. In the end, I bind the base 
data sets for each convocation into one. 
So, the final data set consists of bills as cases and has variables for bill’s ID, date and time of its voting, 
legislative success, the status of the bill in terms of its initiators belonging to (non-) governmental 
faction, the gender of bills’ initiators, number of bill’s initiators, bill’s issue, convocation, days before 
elections, and its squared value divided by a thousand. 
6. Operationalization and Method 
In this chapter, I discuss the variables used in the analysis (see Appendix 3) and the method. The 
operationalization in this research is not conceptually complicated. Notable that data availability highly 
dictates variables variety, as well as the possibility to extract or calculate desirable information. The 
software used is R (R Core Team, 2020). 
The hypothesis implies that the dependent variable relates to the bill’s success, i.e., whether the MPs 
support or reject the proposal. So, the dependent variable, legislative success, is a binary one. It also 
points to the method used for the analysis, logistic regression (Long and Freese, 2014, 386).  
The primary independent variable initiators’ group is a categorical variable. It indicates the bill’s 
initiators’ allegiance at the time of voting for the proposal and is used to test H1, H2. There are three 
categories possible – governmental, i.e., all initiators belong to the governmental faction; 
 
15 Although one may look at the opposition-coalition dichotomy through amendments and suggestions’ support 
by the respective group, it would require additional data collection efforts in the case of Ukraine. 
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nongovernmental, i.e., all initiators belong to the nongovernmental faction, and mixed, i.e., the initiators 
of the bill pertain to both governmental and nongovernmental factions. 
To test H3, H4, and H5, I add to the model the other independent variables. So, I include the variables 
for the number of bill’s initiators and days before the next parliamentary elections. To avoid omitted-
variable bias, I also control for the gender of the bill’s initiators, the bill’s issue, and bills’ convocation. 
The variable for the number of bill’s initiators is continuous and may range from 1 to 450. The name 
of the variable the days before next parliamentary elections speaks for itself. I also include in the model 
its square term divided by a thousand. I square in case the relation is non-linear and, at some point, 
wears off and divide by a thousand not to run into numerical issues, because the numbers can be very 
high and make the model crash. 
The variable for gender uses a narrow binary approach to this concept. There are three possible 
categories for the gender of the bill’s initiators – male, i.e., all initiators are males; female, i.e., all 
initiators are females, and both, i.e., initiators are both males and females. Bill’s issue is the other 
variable, possibly influencing the success of the bill. It has seven categories – bilateral international 
agreements, economic policy, humanitarian policy, legal policy, sectoral development, security and 
defense, social policy, state-building. 
7. Data Description 
The final data set consists of 2868 cases. One can find the distribution of bills in each convocation and 
general in Table 1. One can see that nearly 57 percent of the cases come from convocation 6. Almost 
57 percent of the total cases are rejected. Almost 31.5 percent of bills belong to nongovernmental and 
mixed initiators’ group each, and 37 percent belong to governmental initiators. Males initiated 69 
percent of cases, and the most popular issues are sectoral development and economic policy. 
Table 1. The Distribution of Bills in Each Convocation and General. 
  Convocation 6 Convocation 7 Convocation 8 Total 
 Total 1624 367 877 2868 
Legislative 
Success 
Support 568 171 499 1238 
Rejection 1056  196 378 1630 
Initiators’ 
Group 
Nongovernmental 699 98 104 901 
Governmental 587 186 290 1063 
Mixed 338 83 483 904 
Gender Male 1302 272 400 1974 
Female 115 19 29 163 
Both 207     76 448 731 
Issue Bilateral International 
Agreements 
- 3 5 8 
Economic policy 372 81 212 665 
Humanitarian policy 40 7 20 67 
Legal Policy 389 65 138 592 
Sectoral 
Development 
505 115 330 950 
Security and Defense 19 11 50 80 
Social Policy 143  50 76 269 
State-Building 156 35 46 237 
Table 2 presents the crosstabulation of the variables (see Appendix 3) relevant to H1 and H2. The 
nongovernmental bills were rejected in 43 percent of cases. On the contrary, the governmental ones 
found support in 45 percent of cases. The governmental proposals were supported almost as often as 
were rejected. Practically, the same is true for the mixed initiators’ group. Regarding the 
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nongovernmental bills, only every fifth one passes. One can find the crosstabulation of all categorical 
variables in Appendix 4. 
Table 2. The Crosstabulation of Variables Relevant to H1 and H2. 
Legislative Success        Governmental Mixed Nongovernmental Total 
Rejection 
 
501 421 708 1630 
Support  562 483 193 1238 
Total  1063 904 901 2868 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the bills according to the number of initiators. Almost 43 percent 
of the cases have a single initiator, about 18 percent – have two initiators, nearly 11 percent – have three 
initiators. When the value turns to 11 initiators, the values’ share is responsible for less than one percent 
for each, which in total approximates 7 percent. The maximum number of initiators is 256 MPs. 
 
Figure 4 presents the bills’ distribution according to the number of initiators within each initiators’ 
group. In the governmental group, one MP initiates nearly 59 percent of cases, two MPs – almost 21 
percent, three MPs – 8 percent. When the value turns to 8 initiators, the values’ shares are responsible 
for less than one percent for each, which in total approximates 4 percent. The maximum number of 
governmental initiators is 42 MPs. The mixed group is the most diverse in terms of the distribution of 
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the number of initiators. For MPs from two to thirteen, the values’ shares are in-between 2 and 15 
percent. The rest of the cases cover 14 percent of cases within mixed initiators’ group. The maximum 
number of mixed initiators is 256 MPs. In the nongovernmental group, one MP initiates 67 percent of 
bills; two MPs sponsor 19 percent; three MPs – nearly 9 percent; and four MPs – a bit over 1 percent. 
Then, the values’ shares become less than one percent for each, which in total is less than 4 percent. 
The maximum number of nongovernmental initiators is 20 MPs. 
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the bills according to the approximation of elections. The proposals 
are grouped by 30 days, i.e., roughly a month. One may see the increasing tendency towards the coming 
elections. Note that one should treat the variable Days before Elections with caution. The elections 
following convocation 7 and 8 were snap. For the former, the convocation ended three years before the 
regular elections if they would have happened. For the latter, the next elections took place only three 
months earlier than the regular one. So, possibly, the variable does not describe the behavior of MPs to 
its full. Nevertheless, I keep it since, when MPs find out the date for the snap elections, they possibly 
may put more effort into passing their legislative proposals.  
Figure 6 presents the distribution of the bills according to the approximation of elections within each 
initiators’ group. Starting from a year before the date of the elections, the MPs consider more 
governmental proposals at the plenary session than mixed or nongovernmental ones. However, there 
are still periods when there are more nongovernmental bills voted at the plenary sessions. 
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8. Analysis and Results 
In this chapter, I present and discuss the regression results. Then, I do some additional tests. The last 
section relates the findings to the hypotheses. 
Regression Results and Their Interpretation 
Table 3 shows the regression results of fitting the models to data. I do not discuss the changes in the 
models with the addition of the controls to the initiators’ group’s focal variable since it would be too 
monotonous. Being guided by the lowest Akaike information criterion as one of the goodness-of-fit 
measurements, I chose Model 8 to be the basis in the analysis. Notice, in Model 9, the results hold when 
a large number of additional covariates are included. However, the control variable for the issue does 
not explain much of the variation. The addition of this variable slightly deteriorates the model’s fit. So, 
I proceed with the analysis of Model 8 as the best-fit model. 
Since the primary independent variable – initiators’ group – is a categorical one, the governmental 
group is excluded from the regression and is the reference category. It means that the coefficients for 
the other groups of initiators are interpreted as the change in the dependent variable when moving from 
a governmental group of initiators to the other groups. The same relates to the variable for gender, with 
the reference category being both genders; convocation, with convocation 6 being the reference one; 
and issue, with international agreements being the reference category. 
In Model 8, there are several significant coefficients, which I address further. Nongovernmental bills 
are less likely to be adopted compared to governmental bills (p<0.01). The interaction between the 
nongovernmental bills and the number of initiators signifies that with the increase of the number of 
initiators, the likelihood of the nongovernmental bill success decreases (p<0.01). The variable for the 
days before elections indicates that the further from the election’s day, the probability for the bill 
adoption decreases (p<0.05). The more comprehensible interpretation is that with the approach of 
elections, the likelihood of the bill’s success increases. The interaction between the nongovernmental 
bills and the days before elections (squared and divided by 1000) indicates that with the approach of 
the next election, the likelihood of nongovernmental bills success decreases (p<0.01). Bills initiated by 
only males are less likely to be adopted in contrast to those initiated by both males and females (p<0.1). 
In logistic regression, the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Bearing that in mind, I plot the 
conditional predicted values and average marginal effects of covariates included in Model 8 with a 
confidence interval of 0.95 (see Figures 7-11). In Figure 7, the magnitude of the confidence intervals 
of the conditional predicted values of the number of initiators is high. It only narrows down when the 
variable reaches the meaning of 226, which is a simple majority.  
In Figure 8, the magnitude of the confidence intervals of the conditional predicted values of the days 
before elections is narrower in the middle meanings. In Figure 9, the marginal effects for each initiators’ 
group are almost the same. One can relate it to the about the same number of bills of each group in the 
data set. When the number of bills in the categories vastly differs, one can see different magnitudes of 
marginal effects as for gender and to a smaller extent for convocation in Figures 10-11. 
In Figures 12-15, I visualize the changes in the coefficient estimates of nongovernmental initiated bills 
(Figure 12, 14) and mixed initiated bills (Figure 13, 15) in a two-way interaction term conditional on 
the value of the number of initiators (Figure 12, 13) and the value of the days before elections (squared 
and divided by 1000) (Figure 14, 15). The plots also include simulated 95% confidential intervals of 
the coefficients. Confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of nongovernmental, as well as mixed, 
bills in interaction with the number of initiators have a cone-like shape (see Figures 12-13). One can 
relate it to most of the cases distributed at the beginning of the number of initiators scale (see Figure 3). 
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Table 3. Regression Results (Convocations 6,7, and 8). 
 Dependent variable: 
 Legislative Success 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mixed (Ref = 
Governmental) 
0.022 -0.011 0.174 0.142 0.160 0.111 -0.028 -0.133 -0.107 
(0.091) (0.098) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.143) (0.150) (0.152) (0.154) 
Nongovernmental -1.415*** -1.412*** -1.040*** -1.057*** -1.000*** -1.308*** -1.281*** -1.248*** -1.216*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.189) (0.192) (0.191) (0.192) 
Number of Initiators  0.005 0.084*** 0.069** 0.055* 0.075** 0.046 0.027 0.026 
  (0.006) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) 
Mixed * Number of Initiators  -0.081*** -0.066** -0.053* -0.073** -0.048 -0.033 -0.032 
   (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
Nongovernmental * 
Number of Initiators 
  -0.214** -0.204** -0.206** -0.259*** -0.271*** -0.265*** -0.268*** 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.091) (0.089) (0.090) 
Days before Elections    0.0002** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
    (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Days before Elections  
(^2 /1000) 
    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004** 0.0004* 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Mixed * Days before Elections 
(^2 /1000) 
     0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
     (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Nongovernmental * Days 
before Elections (^2 /1000) 
     0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
     (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female (Ref = Both)       -0.423** -0.338 -0.341 
       (0.208) (0.210) (0.210) 
Male       -0.313*** -0.210* -0.218** 
       (0.108) (0.110) (0.111) 
Convocation 7  
(Ref = 6) 
       0.293** 0.290** 
       (0.134) (0.135) 
Convocation 8        0.508*** 0.493*** 
        (0.105) (0.106) 
Economic Policy  
(Ref = International 
Agreements) 
        -0.566 
        (0.846) 
Humanitarian Policy         -0.793 
         (0.883) 
Legal Policy         -0.768 
         (0.846) 
Sectoral Development         -0.838 
         (0.845) 
Security and Defense         -0.569 
         (0.873) 
Social Policy         -0.775 
         (0.851) 
State-Building         -0.975 
         (0.853) 
Constant 0.115* 0.103* -0.058 -0.179* 0.116 0.168 0.502*** 0.295 1.043 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.086) (0.099) (0.125) (0.130) (0.171) (0.183) (0.873) 
Observations 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 
Log Likelihood -1,827.59 -1,827.15 -1,821.32 -1,818.30 -1,810.94 -1,802.92 -1,798.40 -1,785.81 -1,780.55 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,661.180 3,662.292 3,654.645 3,650.604 3,637.889 3,625.847 3,620.794 3,599.627 3,603.094 
Note:     *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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So, for the results plotted in Figure 12-13, there is a potential problem of extrapolation, i.e., concluding 
based on the assumption that the trend continues and remains applicable. There, the higher is the value 
for the number of initiators, the more decreases the confidence in the coefficient since the confidence 
intervals increase. It indicates that only the estimates at the beginning of the scale may be trusted, 
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provided that the coefficient is significant. The same partially relates to the estimated coefficients of 
nongovernmental and mixed bills in interaction with the days before elections (see Figures 12-13). 
Additional Tests and Discussion of Results 
To take care of the possible differences between the convocations and take out the variation, which may 
affect the results, I cluster standard errors at the convocation level. Table 4 presents the comparison of 
the coefficients of Model 8 and the coefficients after clustering. I find broadly similar results. 
Nevertheless, one should take notice that some of the coefficients become or lose significance. The 
number of initiators becomes positively significant (p<0.01). The interaction of the mixed group and 
the number of initiators becomes negatively significant (p<0.01). The coefficient for the days before 
elections loses significance. The same occurs for the interaction of the nongovernmental group with the 
days before elections (squared and divided by 1000). In the control variable gender, the category for 
male initiators loses significance, while the one for female initiators becomes negatively significant 
(**p<0.05). To compare the coefficients for Model 8 and clustered standard errors, see Figure 16.  
Table 4. Regression Results for Model 8 and Clustered SEs 
 Dependent variable: 
 Legislative Success 
 Model 8 Clustered SEs 
Mixed (Ref = Governmental) -0.133 -0.133 
 (0.152) (0.201) 
Nongovernmental -1.248*** -1.248*** 
 (0.191) (0.351) 
Number of Initiators 0.027 0.027*** 
 (0.030) (0.009) 
Mixed * Number of Initiators -0.033 -0.033*** 
 (0.030) (0.010) 
Nongovernmental * Number of Initiators -0.265*** -0.265*** 
 (0.089) (0.009) 
Days before Elections -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.0003) (0.001) 
Days before Elections (^2 /1000) 0.0004** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Mixed * Days before Elections (^2 /1000) 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Nongovernmental * Days before Elections (^2 /1000) 0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Female (Ref = Both) -0.338 -0.338** 
 (0.210) (0.168) 
Male -0.210* -0.210 
 (0.110) (0.154) 
Convocation 7 (Ref = 6) 0.293** 0.293*** 
 (0.134) (0.108) 
Convocation 8 0.508*** 0.508*** 
 (0.105) (0.091) 
Constant 0.295 0.295 
 (0.183) (0.284) 
Observations 2,868 2,868 
Log Likelihood -1,785.813 -1,785.813 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,599.627 3,599.627 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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In Figure 17, I estimate the goodness of fit, i.e., how much the real value of the variable legislative 
success corresponds to the predicted value of this variable. First, based on the model coefficients, I 
count probabilities for each case in the data set. Then, I need to define the cutoff point and attribute the 
predicted probabilities to the groups of successful and rejected bills. To this end, I match the specificity 
(true negative rate) of the prediction with its sensitivity (true positive rate) and its accuracy. The 
intersection of these indicators is the cutoff, and in this case, it is nearly 0.477. I attribute the cases with 
the predicted probabilities below 0.477 to the group of rejected bills and vice versa. In the end, I define 
whether the predicted probability gives the correct prediction that, in this case, is almost 64 percent. 
 
Hence, in line with H1, bills sponsored by the opposition have a lower probability of success than the 
bills sponsored by the government. I do not find support to H2 that the proposals of mixed 
cosponsorship have a higher likelihood of being successful than those of governmental sponsorship 
since the coefficient is not significant. Based on the basic regression model, I fail to support to H3. 
However, when the standard errors are clustered, there is a strong relationship between the increase of 
cosponsors and legislative success. H4 finds full support also in the model with clustered SEs. The 
increase in cosponsors negatively affects the success of opposition and mixed bills, although, for the 
latter, the coefficient is smaller. H5 cannot be supported. Although the basic model indicates that, with 
the approach of elections, the probability of the bill’s success increases and the likelihood of opposition 
bill success decreases, the model with clustered SEs turns the coefficient to not significant. After 
clustering SEs, H6 cannot be supported. So, there is no support that the upcoming elections influence 
the adoption of bills of different sponsorship differently. 
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9. Concluding Remarks 
Below, I relate the findings to the broader theoretical perspective. I also speak about generalizability, 
limitations, and avenues for further studies. In this thesis, I scrutinize whether ignoring opposition’s 
alternatives or ideas occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. Based on a 
typical case with the gradual democratic backsliding, Ukraine, I analyze 2868 bills that reached the 
plenary voting throughout convocations 6-8 (2007-2019). Along with the oppositional origin as the 
bill’s success determinant, I investigate the influence of the cosponsors’ number and the approximation 
of the elections. I also control for the bill’s issue and its initiator’s gender. 
The findings of this research on the autocratizing regime are predominantly in alliance with the previous 
studies on stable regimes. First, bills sponsored by the opposition are less likely to be adopted than 
those sponsored by the government. I conclude nothing about the cause of this difference since it may 
stem from either regime dynamics, as assumed in this study, or from the institutional framework, as 
theorized in some previous research (Hix and Noury, 2016) or both. The assumption of the regime 
dynamics is novel, so it requires further investigation. 
Second, the more cosponsors, the higher are the chances for bills’ adoption. This finding is also in line 
with previous research (Aleman and Calvo, 2008). However, one should interpret this finding carefully. 
The predictor not researched previously and introduced in this study, the interaction of the cosponsors’ 
number and the cosponsorship groups, indicates that the success of mixed and opposition bills decreases 
with the cosponsors increasing. It urges to treat the findings regarding the sole influence of the 
cosponsors increasing with caution, especially when the number of cosponsors in opposition and mixed 
groups is high. The other previously not researched predictor, by which this study also contributes to 
the field of the legislative success determinants, is elections proximity. To my knowledge, it has not 
been tested with continuous operationalization. However, elections proximity fails to find support as a 
sole predictor of legislative success. The same is true for its interaction with the (co)sponsorship groups. 
This research has a few limitations. The main one stems from the approach to defining the opposition, 
which does not account for the intra-party opposition, which is a common occurrence in the history of 
parliamentary activities (Ostapchuk, n.d.; Nadelniuk, n.d.). So, by ignoring an individual position, I 
could have assigned the MPs to the de facto wrong initiator’s group, which, in turn, could have distorted 
the findings. The other limitation comes from the cases of analyzed bills. They are restricted to those 
considered at the plenary sessions and encompass 2868 bills. However, during the research period, MPs 
initiated 14 700 bills, i.e., nearly 80 percent of initiated proposals are left out of the analysis. One more 
limitation relates to the assumption that MPs initiate bills with the prospects to pass them. If not, that 
may influence the quality of the text and content, sponsors’ efforts to attract support, etc. If the 
opposition pursues populistic rhetoric and sponsors unrealistic bills, then there is no wonder that 
political exclusion occurs. It points to the other limitation of the legislative success determinants, which 
is the content of the bill itself. To evaluate such a predictor in the large-scale analysis would take a lot 
of coding efforts. However, even with such an investment, the subjectivity of evaluation would leave 
the room for questioning the results. 
The broad implication of the research is that, in the autocratizing regimes, as well as in the stable ones 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Aleman and Calvo, 2008; Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013), the government pursues 
its agenda and rarely adopts opposition’s policy proposals. So, for the opposition, the parliament is 
unlikely the right forum for bargaining and compromise. Based on the common patterns, one may 
suggest that the regime type has nothing to do with opposition’s legislative success and that it depends 
on the institutional system (Hix and Noury, 2016). So, the study’s generalizability is limited by the 
institutional systems with the government-opposition split in parliaments (Hix and Noury, 2016) and 
autocratizing polities. 
So, the avenue for further research is to look at the presidential systems with coalition governments or 
parliamentary systems with minority governments, where coalitions must be built issue by issue. One 
should consider and compare the cases with different regime dynamics to argue whether the regime’s 
dynamics influence the opposition’s legislative success.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. Governmental Factions: Convocations 6 through 8. 
Convocation Faction (Group) In Out 
Second Tymoshenko Government (18 Dec 2007 – 11 March 2010) 
The Coalition of Democratic Forces (29 Nov 2007 – 17 Dec 2008)16 
6 The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 29 Nov 2007 17 Dec 2008 
6 The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-
Defense Bloc 
29 Nov 2007 17 Dec 2008 
The Coalition of “National Development, Stability, and Order” (17 Dec 2008 – 11 Mar 2010)17 
6 The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 17 Dec 2008 11 Mar 2010 
6 The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-
Defense Bloc 
17 Dec 2008 11 Mar 2010 
6 The Lytvyn Bloc 17 Dec 2008 11 Mar 2010 
First Azarov Government (11 March 2010 – 3 Dec 2012) 
Coalition “Stability and Reforms”18 (11 Mar 2010 – 12 Dec 2012) 
6 The Party of Regions 11 Mar 2010 12 Dec 2012 
6 The Communist Party of Ukraine 11 Mar 2010 12 Dec 2012 
6 The Lytvyn Bloc 11 Mar 2010 12 Dec 2012 
6 Some MPs 11 Mar 2010 12 Dec 2012 
Second Azarov Government (13 Dec 2012 – 28 Jan 2014) 
Factions Appointing the Government19 (12 Dec 2012 – 20 Feb 2014) 
7 The Party of Regions 12 Dec 2012 20 Feb 2014 
7 The Communist Party of Ukraine 12 Dec 2012 20 Feb 2014 
 
  
 
16 Pro stvorennia Koalitsii democretychnykh syl u Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy VI sklykannia [On the creation of 
the Coalition of the democratic forces in the Parliament of Ukraine in convocation VI]. (2008). Retrieved 10 May 
2020, from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003001-07 
17 Uhoda pro stvorennia Koalitsii “Natsionalnoho rozvytku, stabilnosti ta poriadku” [The Agreement on the 
creation of the Coalition of the “National development, stability, and order”]. (2008). Retrieved 10 May 2020, 
from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-08 
18 Pro stvorennia Koalitsii deputatskykh fraktsiy “Stabilnist I reformy” u Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy shottoho 
sklykannia [ On the creation of the Coalition of the factions “Stability and Reforms” in the Parliament of Ukrine 
of the sixth convocation]. (2010). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-
10  
19 Poimenne holosuvannia pro nadannia zhody na pryznachennia Prezydentom Ukrainy Premier-ministrom 
Ukrainy Azarova M.Y. [Roll-call vote on consent to the appointment of Mykola Azarov by the President of 
Ukraine as the Prime Minister of Ukraine]. (2012). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=8407&n_skl=7 
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Appendix 1. Governmental Factions: Convocations 6 through 8. – Continued. 
 
First Yatseniuk Government (27 Feb 2014 – 27 Nov 2014) 
Coalition “European Choice” 20 (27 Feb 2014 – 24 Jul 201421) 
7 All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 27 Feb 2014 24 Jul 2014 
7 Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for 
Reform (UDAR) 
27 Feb 2014 24 Jul 2014 
7 All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"  27 Feb 2014 24 Jul 2014 
7 Group Economic Development 27 Feb 2014 24 Jul 2014 
7 Group Sovereign European Ukraine 27 Feb 2014 24 Jul 2014 
Second Yatseniuk Government (27 Nov 2014 – 14 April 2016) 
First Groysman Government (14 April 2016 – 29 August 2019) 
Coalition “European Ukraine” 22 (27 Nov 2014 – 17 May 201923) 
8 Petro Poroshenko Bloc 27 Nov 2014 17 May 2019 
8 People’s Front 27 Nov 2014 17 May 2019 
8 All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 27 Nov 2014 18 Feb 201624 
8 Self-Reliance 27 Nov 2014 19 Feb 201625 
8 Radical Party of Oleh Liashko 27 Nov 2014 1 Sep 201526 
 
  
 
20 U Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy utvoreno koalitsiyu “Yevropeyskyi Vybir” [The coalition “European Choice” is 
created in the Parliament of Ukraine]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from 
http://mportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Povidomlennya/88617.html 
21 Udar i “Svoboda” vyishly z koalitsii [Udar and “Svoboda” left the coalition]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, 
from https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/07/24/7032845/ 
22 Uhoda pro Koalitsiyu deputatskykh fraktsiy “Yevropeyska Ukraina” [The Coalition agreement of the factions 
“European Ukraine”]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-15 
23 Koalitsiia prypynyla isnuvannia – rozpusk Rady nemozhlyvyi [The coalition ceased existence – the Parliament 
cannot be dissolved] (2019). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/05/17/7215275/  
24 Groysman oholosyv pro vykhid “Batkivshchyny” z koalitsii [Groysman has declared “Fatherland” left the 
coalition]. (2016). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/18/7099503/ 
25 Groysman lehalizuvav vykhid “Samopomochi” [Groysman has legalized the exit of the “Self-Reliance”] 
(2016). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/19/7099562/ 
26 Liashko oholosyv pro perekhid v opozytsiiu i zabrav svoho vitse-premiera z Kabminu [Liashko declared about 
switching to opposition and took his vice-premier from the Cabinet]. (2015). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/09/1/7079763/ 
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Appendix 2. Defined as Governing Parties within the Indicated Period While 
Coding 
Convocation Faction In Out 
6 The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 2007-11-2327 2010-03-11 
6 The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc 2007-11-23 2010-03-11 
6 The Lytvyn Bloc 2008-12-17 2012-12-12 
6 The Party of Regions 2010-03-11 2012-12-12 
6 The Communist Party of Ukraine 2010-03-11 2012-12-12 
6 Some MPs28 2010-03-11 2012-12-12 
    
7 The Party of Regions 2012-12-12  2014-02-27 
7 The Communist Party of Ukraine 2012-12-12 2014-02-27  
7 All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 2014-02-27 2014-11-2729 
7 Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) 2014-02-27 2014-11-27 
7 All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"  2014-02-27 2014-11-27 
7 Group Economic Development 2014-02-27 2014-11-27 
7 Group Sovereign European Ukraine 2014-02-27  2014-11-27 
    
8 People’s Front 2014-11-27  2019-08-2930 
8 Petro Poroshenko Bloc 2014-11-27  2019-08-29 
8 All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 2014-11-27 2016-02-18 
8 Self-Reliance 2014-11-27 2016-02-19 
8 Radical Party of Oleh Liashko 2014-11-27 2015-09-01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
27 The first meeting of this convocation took place on Nov 23. It was the only meeting before the coalition 
formation. I do not code to drop the activities on Nov 23 since then no bill was adopted. 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_h2?day_=23&month_=11&year=2007&nom_s=1&nom_skl=6 
. Further, the day of the coalition formation coincides with the first meeting of that convocation.  
28 Names indicated in the code. 
29 Since the dissolution of the coalition on Jul 24, 2014, was a political move to start the procedure of snap 
elections, I ignore that dissolution and code as if the coalition did not fall apart. 
30 Since the dissolution of the coalition on May 17, 2019, was a political move to prevent the President from 
starting the procedure of the snap elections, I ignore it and code as if the coalition did not fall apart. 
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Appendix 3. Variables Operationalization 
Variable Name in the 
Dataset 
Type Meaning 
Legislative success  passed Boolean Possible values: 
TRUE for the passed bills,  
FALSE for the bills, which have not passed. 
Group of initiators  init_status Categorical Possible values: 
nongov – for the bills, where initiators did not 
belong to the governing faction at the time of 
voting for the bill, 
gov_all – for the bills, where all initiators 
belonged to the governing faction at the time 
of voting for the bill, 
gov_some – for the bills, where some initiators 
belonged to the governing faction at the time 
of voting for the bill. 
Number of initiators no_init Continuous Number of MPs, who initiated the bill. 
Gender of initiators gender Categorical Possible values: 
male – all initiators of the bill are males, 
female – all initiators of the bill are females, 
both – initiators of the bill are males and 
females. 
Days before next 
parliamentary 
elections 
days_be Continuous Indicates how many days before the next 
parliamentary elections, MPs voted for the 
bill.  
Days before next 
parliamentary 
elections (squared 
and divided by 1000) 
days_be_sq
_1000 
Continuous Indicates how many days before the next 
parliamentary elections, MPs voted for the bill 
(squared and divided by 1000).   
Convocation convocation Categorical Possible values: 
6 – bill belongs to convocation six, 
7 – bill belongs to convocation seven, 
8 – bill belongs to convocation eight. 
Issue rubric Categorical Possible values: 
Bilateral International Agreements, 
Economic Policy, 
Humanitarian Policy, 
Legal Policy, 
Sectoral Development, 
Security and Defense, 
Social Policy, 
State Building. 
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Appendix 4. The Crosstabulation of Categorical Variables 
   Initiators’ Group 
Issue              Gender Legislative 
Success 
Governmental Mixed Nongovernmental 
Bilateral 
International 
Agreements 
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
       
Rejection 0 0 1 
Support 4 0 0 
Female 
       
Rejection 0 0 0 
Support 0 0 0 
Male   
       
Rejection 0 0 2 
Support 0 0 1 
Economic policy                    
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both
   
Rejection 16 45 15 
Support 23 71 6 
Female 
       
Rejection 10 2 15 
Support 4 1 3 
Male   
       
Rejection 97 47 84 
Support 162 40 24 
Humanitarian 
policy                
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
       
Rejection 0 6 1 
Support 3 9 0 
Female 
       
Rejection 0 0 3 
Support 2 0 0 
Male   
       
Rejection 11 2 16 
Support 10 3 1 
Legal policy                       
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
   
Rejection 9 36 10 
Support 12 26 7 
Female 
       
Rejection 2 1 14 
Support 2 1 3 
Male   
       
Rejection 91 43 155 
Support 86 44 50 
Sectoral 
Development               
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
  
Rejection 19 94 22 
Support 31 113 19 
Female 
       
Rejection 17 0 26 
Support 13 8 9 
Male   
       
Rejection 123 87 155 
Support 98 82 34 
Security and 
Defense               
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
       
Rejection 2 6 0 
Support 8 8 0 
Female 
       
Rejection 1 0 0 
Support 2 1 0 
Male   
       
Rejection 10 9 7 
Support 12 10 4 
Social Policy                      
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both   
   
Rejection 7 9 11 
Support 11 13 5 
Female 
       
Rejection 4 0 7 
Support 2 1 1 
Male   Rejection 40 12 72 
40 
 
                                      Support 35 23 16 
State-Building                     
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
                                   
Both  
   
Rejection 6 13 8 
Support 7 19 0 
Female 
       
Rejection 0 0 8 
Support 0 0 0 
Male   
       
Rejection 36 9 76 
Support 35 10 10 
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Appendix 5. List of the Archived Files 
R script: 
1. “1. Data Management - Convocation 6.R” 
2. “2. Data Management - Convocation 7.R” 
3. “3. Data Management - Convocation 8.R” 
4. “4. Data Description.R” 
5. “5. Analysis.R” 
Data sets downloaded from https://data.rada.gov.ua/ 
6. “mps-trans_fr_arh.csv” 
7. “mps06-data.csv” 
8. “mps07-data.csv” 
9. “mps08-data.csv” 
10. “plenary_event_question-skl6.csv” 
11. “plenary_event_question-skl7.csv” 
12. “plenary_event_question-skl8.csv” 
13. “bills-skl6.json” 
14. “bills-skl7.json” 
15. “bills-skl8.json” 
Data sets downloaded from https://www.v-dem.net/ 
16. “cases.csv” 
17. “UkraineLDI.csv” 
 
